How America reduces its military presence in Europe may matter just as much as whether it does — and a major new study warns that getting it wrong could cost U.S. defense companies billions in lost foreign sales. The difference between a well-managed drawdown and a sudden, chaotic one could reshape which countries European allies turn to when they need weapons.
A new report from the RAND Corporation examines how four key NATO allies — France, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom — would likely respond to various forms of reduced U.S. military commitment in Europe. Released Wednesday and titled “Anticipating Allies’ Responses to U.S. Retrenchment from Europe,” the study is based on Cold War historical precedents, allied government documents, and interviews with 51 officials and experts across those four countries, most conducted between April and November 2025.
The central finding is straightforward: the manner of any U.S. withdrawal matters enormously. The four allies
“see a stark difference between a coordinated, orderly U.S. withdrawal, which they feel they could handle, and a rapid, uncoordinated one, which they see as creating major capability gaps and potentially emboldening Russia to attack a NATO member,”
the authors wrote.
The Stakes for American Defense Firms
A rushed, uncoordinated pullback could ultimately drive European allies away from American-made weapons — not immediately, but over time. In the short term, allies would likely buy off-the-shelf equipment, often from U.S. suppliers, just to fill urgent gaps. But over the long term, a breach of trust would push them toward European or domestically produced alternatives.
The report put the economic consequences plainly:
“Such a shift would be detrimental to the U.S. defense industrial base, which benefits from exports that help create economies of scale. The main cause of this shift would be perceptions of U.S. reliability as an ally rather than the loss of any specific U.S. military capabilities.”
This concern is grounded in real trends. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the U.S. supplied 58% of major weapons imported by European NATO members between 2021 and 2025, already down from 64% in the institute’s previous five-year count.
Germany, for example, has historically bought American weapons partly as a signal to Washington that it values the alliance. If the U.S. pulls back suddenly, Berlin
“may not see a benefit to continuing to privilege U.S. firms for arms sales or other deals,”
the authors write. The United Kingdom would face similar pressures, with a sudden withdrawal likely to
“accelerate the UK’s reorientation away from U.S. defense equipment toward sovereign or European alternatives.”
France, already the most independent of the four when it comes to U.S. weapons, would see little change in purchasing behavior — but French officials told RAND their military would still depend heavily on American capabilities during wartime, including intelligence, long-range strike, fighter jets, air and missile defense, and logistics. A sudden pullout, Paris warned, would signal that Washington cares little about its allies’ security, potentially straining future diplomatic and military cooperation.
What’s Already Happening on the Ground
The U.S. military’s footprint in Europe has already begun to shrink. Approximately 80,000 American troops were stationed across roughly 30 European bases as of 2025. In May, the Pentagon announced it would pull about 5,000 troops out of Germany. In June, the U.S. cut the forces it would make available to NATO in a crisis. A broader review of U.S. forces in Europe is currently underway, with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth expected to receive at least four sets of troop options by November 6 and a full review due in December, according to a Pentagon document seen by Reuters.
These moves align with the concept known as NATO 3.0, presented by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby in February. The concept envisions Europe taking primary responsibility for its own non-nuclear defense while the U.S. shifts focus and resources to the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific. But the RAND authors caution that this vision currently lacks specifics:
“NATO 3.0 is a vision for a reduced U.S. role and reallocation of resources. But there is no concrete, long-term plan.”
The questionnaires the Pentagon sent allies as part of the ongoing review asked about defense spending and support for U.S. foreign policy priorities. Some allies interpreted those questions as a sign that troop levels might hinge on political alignment with Washington — a dynamic the RAND authors warn against.
Poland: A Case Study in Uncertainty
Poland’s recent experience highlights the risks of unpredictable U.S. troop decisions. In May, the Pentagon abruptly canceled a planned deployment of about 4,000 soldiers to Poland. President Donald Trump later pledged to send 5,000 troops at an unspecified future date. Warsaw credited the reversal partly to reminding Washington that Poland is a “model ally” that buys American military systems.
The RAND authors said the episode illustrates both what Poland expects in return for its loyalty and the fragility of that approach: U.S. troop levels rest on
“abrupt, easily reversible decisions.”
Poland has nonetheless pushed ahead with defense investment. It has more than doubled defense spending as a share of GDP since 2014 and is targeting 5% of GDP this year — the highest among the four countries studied. All four allies, along with Italy, committed to NATO’s target of at least 3.5% of GDP for core defense spending by 2035, according to the alliance’s 2025 summit declaration.
European Allies Stepping Up — But Unevenly
Germany plans to spend €649 billion on its military over five years, raising defense spending from 2.4% of GDP in 2025 to 3.5% by 2029, Defense News reported. France and the U.K., however, face steeper challenges due to high debt and sluggish economic growth.
French public debt climbed from 98% of GDP in 2019 to an average of 112% between 2020 and 2024. One interviewee described the budget problem as France’s
“Achilles’ heel”
in any effort to rearm. The U.K. Ministry of Defence requested an extra £28 billion to cover a funding shortfall through 2030 and received £15 billion. The British government announced October 28 it would fully fund its Defence Investment Plan, Reuters reported.
British Defense Secretary Wes Streeting has argued that the choice between European and American equipment doesn’t have to be binary. Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, he said buying European or American equipment
“should not be an either/or choice,”
noting that British industry produces about 15% of each F-35 aircraft.
In a joint statement released Monday, defense ministers from France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the U.K. said Europe
“must assume greater responsibility for its own security,”
while still calling the United States
“an indispensable Ally.”
The five ministers also pledged
“closer defence-industrial cooperation.”
In the same statement, the five nations labeled Russia
“the most acute and long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability.”
The RAND authors note that, whatever disagreements arise, none of the four allies studied would align with Russia or China on security matters under any scenario examined.
“Some strategists’ fears about allies aligning with Russia as the United States draws down are overblown,”
the authors wrote. Some allies have, however, already quietly reduced intelligence sharing with Washington over specific disputes — the U.K. over U.S. military operations in the Caribbean, and the Netherlands over U.S. policy toward Russia — though the report describes both reductions as modest.
The RAND authors recommend that U.S. policymakers work directly with allies to establish clear, long-term plans — specifying how many American troops would remain in Europe during peacetime, how many would be committed in a crisis, and a realistic timeline for any transition. Predictable plans that give allies a genuine voice, they argue,
“could sustain a continued, if reimagined, transatlantic partnership.”
Using troops and commitments as bargaining chips, by contrast,
“could undercut regional cooperation and, in turn, NATO 3.0’s goal of European strength.”
